Assessment of constraints on space shuttle launch rates by unknown
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19830027788 2020-03-21T01:06:37+00:00Z
Assessment of Constraints on
Space Shuttle Launch Rates
S
PD81
National Research Council, Washington, DC
Prepared for
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC
Apr 83

REPORT DOCUMENTATION ^• RefroRT ^• ft. i. Raelotant'• Aeeastlon No.
P8$ y	 2179 76PAGE
4. TltN r-d sub MN R Rpaet Dow
Assessment of Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates April 1983
7. Au"feNy Panel to Assess Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates,
on RASA Snienti*112 E T
grfande4 orseakwum aepL N''
S. he orm ft orpnl:etWn Nun• and Addme IL Pn) wv T@m/vft& unn so&
National Research Council
Committee on NASA Program Reviews 11. Cw*nwM w OneettO) Na.
(Panel to Assess Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates) tq NASW - 3511
2101 Constitution Avenue NW Order No. 4
Washington, D.C.	 20418
it $WnseAns Orpnisatlen Nam• and Addran I& T7oa N Roped 4 Frriad Cawmd
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Final
Washington, D.C.
	 20546
1d.
1s Suppanosm News - )rrepared in response to Congressional Appropriations Committees' request to
NASA that the NRC estimate the range of number of annual STS flights with 4- and 5-orbiter
fleets 6 provide an overview of capabilities needed to support annual rates of 24 and up wit
a survey of known constraints 6 emphasis on External Tank
	 ET	 reduction re uirements.
16. Atetmd tuns: nO steedel	 In the 1990 time frame it is expected that a 4-orbiter fleet would "
marginally support 24 space shuttle launches per year, and a 5-orbiter fleet, 30 1AW166s
per year.
	 However, the launch rate would be reduced by extended mission
-.duratibns, frequent
repairs, long overhaul periods or contingencies incapacitating an orbiter for a prolonged
period.
	 Of the major components of the STS, -the-external tank (ET) is the only one for
which firm planning is in place- to meet launch rates of 24 and above.
	 Improved refurbish-
ment facilities for the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and additional units and spares for the
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) are needed.
Facility capability estimates are provided for ground turnaround, cargo handling,
flight training and flight operations.
	 Emphasizing the complexity of the STS systems and
the R&D nature of present flight experience, it is concluded that the most prominent con-
straints in the early growth of the STS as an operational system may manifest themselves
not as shortages of investment items such as the ET or SRB, but as inability to provide
timely repairs or replacement of flight system components needed to sustain launch rates.
— _
17. DeeunnM Am"s o. Dasaripa
Space Shuttle; Space Transportation System; Constraints on Launch Rates; External Tank
Production Facilities; Solid Rocket Booster Refurbishment; Facilities Supporting STS
Flight Operations
w WeM1f m/OP•n4Adad T*mw
Space Shuttle, Space Transportation System; External Tank, Solid Rocket Booster; Space
Shuttle Main Engine; Orbiter; OPF; VAB; MLP; Launch Pad; Firing Room; VPF, Shuttle Mission
Simulator; STA; Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
e. COSATI FWd/Omm
1A. Avellabi ft Otabnrn; 1R flaaw* Can CMb M 1 4 21. 1616 M PORE
Distribution is unlimited. Unclassified
ML tfaardft CNn Me hM 2L Mw
Unclassif ied
^••• nns^,css . ea7	 t;aa IastrwtNes M Rase..	 w><evwer^ eveew sis w-inpaemaeb NTI>!-!f)
Oa/arbn•nt of Cen wwm

F 11
Assessment of Constraints
on Space Shuttle Launch Rates
Prepared by a Panel Convened by the
Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological
Program Reviews
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington. D.C.	 April 1983
' -	 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved
by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members
are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the
Nationai Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The
member!a of the panel responsible for the report were chosen for their
speci%.l competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors
according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee
consisting of members of the Nationz! Academy of Sciences, the
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was established by the National Academy
of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and
technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and of
advising the federal government. The Council operates in accr rdance
with general policies determined by the Academy under the autiority of
its congressional charter of 1863, which establishes the Academy as a
private, nonprofit, self-governing membership corporation. The
Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National
Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in the
conduct of their services to the government, the public, and the
scientific and engineering communities. It is administered jointly by
both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and
1970, respectively, under the charter of the National Academy of
Sciences.
This study was supported :)y the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
Copies of this publication are available from:
Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews
National Research Council
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20418
PANEL TO ASSESS CONSTRAINTS ON SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH RATES
WILLIAM T. HAMILTON, Consultant to the Boeing Company/Retired Vice
President-Chief Scientist, Boeing Military Airplane Company,
Chairman
JOHN G. BORGER, Consultant/Retired Vice President and Chief Engineer,
Pan American World Airways
KELLY H. BURKE, Chairman of the Board, Stafford, Burke and Hecker,
Inc./Retired U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Research,
Development and Acquisition
WILLIS M. HAWKINS, Senior Advisor, Lockheed Corporation/Retired Senior
Vice President, Lockheed Corporation
BENJAMIN HUBERMAN, Vice President, The Consultants International
Group, Inc.
CHRISTOPHER C. KRAFT, JR., Consultant/Retired Director, NASA Lyndon
B. Johnson Space Center
BRYCE POE, II, Consultant/Retired Commander, U.S. Air Force Logistics
Command
WILLIAM A. ANDERS, Member, NRC Committee on NASA Scientific and
Technological Program Reviews, Ex-Officio Member of Panel
EUGENE E. COVERT, Member, NRC Committee on NASA Scientific and
Technological Program reviews, Ex-Officio Member of Panel
ROBERT H. KORKEGI, Study Director
JOANN CLAYTON, Staff Officer
ANNA L. FARRAR, Administrative Assistant
iii
Page intentionally left blank 
PREFACE
I	 INTRODUCTION
II	 APPROACH
III LAUNCH RATES FOR 4 AND
5-ORBITER FLEET
Turnaround and Launch Rate Estimates
Impact of Contingencies on Flight Rates
Launch Rate Findings
IV
	
	 CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT VARIOUS
LAUNCH RATES
Operations
Logistics
Major Investment Items
Orbiter
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Solid Rocket Booster
Payload Preparation ana Integration
V	 EXTERNAL TANK PRODUCTION
Facility Configuz-ation
Impact of Incremental. Production Increases
Findings
VI	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Launch Rates
Capabilities of Major STS Components
Facilities Supporting Flight Operations
Logistics, Maintenance, and Spares
Concluding Remarks
ix
1
3
5
6
9
11
13
13
17
19
19
20
22
24
27
27
28
28
31
31
32
33
34
35
Contents
v
APPENDIXES
A.	 Letter dated October 27, 1982, from the Honorable
Edward P. Boland, U.S. House of Representatives,
and the Honorable Jake earn, U.S. Senate 39
B.	 Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological
Program Reviews 41
C.	 Statement of Task, An Assessment of Constraints
3
on Space Shuttle Launch Rates 43 #
_	 D.	 NASA/Contractor Participants in Briefing Sessions 45 i
E.	 Shuttle Turnaround Operations 47 #	 1
F.	 Solid Rocket Booster Refurbishing and Processing
for Flight 51
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53
ABBREVIATIONS 57
vi
List of Figures and Tables
CHAPTER III
Figure 1	 Range of Orbiter Turnaround Durations
(Circa 1990)	 6
Table I	 Orbiter Flight Capacity	 7
Table II	 Space Shuttle Fleet Capacity	 8
CHAPTER IV
Figure ;e	 KSC Space Shuttle Turnaround Facilities
	 14
Figure 3	 Training and Mission Control Capabilities
(1989-1990)	 16
CHAPTER V
Table III Requirements for External Tank Prod-iction and
Availaoility for Various Production Rates
(Real Year $)	 29
Figure 4	 Major Facilities Requirements to Support Higher
ET Build Rates	 30
CHAPTER VI
Figure 5	 Capabilities of STS Components to Meet Various
:crunch Rates--5- to 7-Day Mission Duration
	 32
Figure 6	 Capabilities Supporting STS Operations
(Cells or Units)	 34
vii
Page intentionally left blank 
Preface
The Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews was
created by the National Research Council in June 1981 as 3 result of a
request by the Congress of the United States to the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration that it establish an ongoing re-
lationship with the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering for the purpose of providing an independent,
objective review of the scientifiv and technological merits of NASA
program changes whenever the Congressional Committees on
Appropriations so direct.l
When a review is requested, the Committee is called into action to
set the terms of reference, select a panel of experts to carry out the
task, and review the resulting report before publication.
Two tasKS have been undertaken to date. The first was a review of
alternative versions of the International Solar Polar Mission, a joint
venture between NASA and the European Space Agency, undertaken in
1981. 2
 The second was a review of proposed reductions in the FY
1983 NASA Aeronautics Research and Technology Program, undertaken in
1982.3
The third task, which is the subject of this report, resulted from
a request by the Congressional Committees on Appropriations to the
NASA Administrator in late October 1982 for an assessment of con-
straints on space shuttle launch rates, with emphasis on External Tank
production (Appendix A). The Committee met on November 18, 1982, to
establish tears of reference (Appendix C) for the review based on the
Congressional request and to nominate a panel to undertake the task.
This gLoup had to be knowledgeable in aerospace engineering, defense
procurement and logistics, airline operations, production and
CCongressional Conference Report 96 -1476, Ncvember 21, 1980.
2The International Solar Polar Mission: A Review and Assessment
of Options, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., September
1981.
Reductions in the FY 1983 NASA Program, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 3uly 1982.
ix
shipment of large structures, the NASA Space Transportation System
(STS), the federal policymaking process, aid current executive branch
policy. In appointing such a group of individuals to make scientific
and technical assessments, it is essential that most hav a high	 i_
degree of expertise in the subject of the study. Because Guch
individuals are apt to appear to have a potential for bias, every
effort was made to achieve a balance in backgrounds and attitudes of
the panelists in order to present as objective a report as possible.
The short period during which the review had to be undertaken put
severe demands on the Chairman and members of the panel, who deserve
much credit for their effective and timely response.
i
Norman Hackerman
Chairman, Committee on NASA Scientific
and Technological Program Reviews
e
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Introduction
The space shuttle consists of a reusable Orbiter vehicle, two re-
coverable Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB), and an expendable External Tank
(ET) that carries the liquid propellant for the Orbiter's three main
engines. Management of the Space Shuttle Program is shared by NASA
Headquarters and three NASA Centers--the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in
Houston, Texas; the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville,
Alabama; and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida.
NASA Headquarters is responsible for overall policy and direc-
tion. The Johnson Space Center is responsible for program management,
flight control, and development of the Orbiter. The Marshall Space
Flight Center's responsibilities include development of the External
Tank, Solid Rocket Booster, and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME).
The Kennedy Space Center serves as the launch and landing site. In
addition, the Department of Defense will operate a launch and landing
site at 'andenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) in California.
Prime contractors are Rockwell International's Space Division for
the Orbiter, its Rocketdyne Division fc.r the Space Shuttle Main
Engine, and Martin Marietta Aerospace for the External Tank. The
Marshall Space Flight Center has retained primary management for the
Solid Rocket Booster, with assembly and checkout operations subcon-
tracted to United Space Boosters, Inc., and the Solid Rocket Motor
subcontracted to Thiokol Corporation.
The current NASA Mission Model calls for 24 space shuttle launches
per year in 1988, 30 in 1990, and 40 in 1992.
The charge to the Panel from the Committee on NASA Scientific and
Tecl.nological Program Reviews (Appendix B) calls for an estimate of
yearly launch rates given a 4- and 5-Orbiter fleet, an assessment of
the capabilities and known constraints associated with launch rates of
18, 24, 30, and 40 per year, and the specific capability of External
Tank production to meet these rates.
1
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Approach
The Panel met on December 15-16, 1982, and on January 10-13 and
March 8-9, 1983. The first and third meetings were held at the
National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. The second meeting
included a visit on January 10 to the Martin Marietta-operated Michoud
Assembly Facility in Louisiana, where the External Tank is produced,
and to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida on January 11-13 for brief-
ings and a tour of facilities associated with space shuttle turn-
around, including the Vehicle Assembly Building, the Orbiter Proces-
sing Facility, Launch Pad A, and the Vertical Processing Facility. On
:larch 28, 1983, a representative from the Panel visited the space
shuttle launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
During the course of its meetings the Panel was briefed by NASA
personnel from Headquarters, the Johnson Space Center, the Marshall
Space Flight Center, and the Kennedy Space Center, as well as person-
nel from Martin Marietta Michoud Division, United Space Boosters,
Inc., and the Thiokol Corpor~lion. A list of briefing personnel is
given in Appendix D.
The Panel took account of other National Research Council studies
that deal with the space shuttle, which include the Assembly of
Engineering's reports, Technical Status of the Space Shuttle Main
Engine, March 1978, and Second Review--Technical Status of the Space
Shuttle Main Engine, February 1979, as well as the General Accounting
Office's report, Issues Concerning the Future Operation of the Space
Transportation System, GAO/MASAD-83-6, December 28, 1982, and the
Congressional Research Service's report on United States Civilian
Space Programs 1958-1978, January 1981.
The charge to the Panel requests the following information:
1. An estimate of the range of the numbrr of annual STS flights,
given a 4- and 5-Orbiter fleet, accounting for normal turnaround time
and contingencies.
2. An overview of the capabilities needed to support these esti-
mated flight rates, including rates of 18, 24, 30, and 40 a year, with
a survey of known constraints or limiting factors.
3. An estimate of the facility modifications and requirements
needed to match production of External Tanks to the above annual
3
4uttle flight rates, including consideration of learning curve
fects.
4. An estimate, based on available Gata, of the costs associated
with the External Tank facility modifications, including any addi-
tional. costs that might be incurred by modifying the facility to first
support 24 flights a year and then later increasing the capability to
support a higher flight rate.
5. An estimate of the date that External Tank production would be
available to support each of the flight rates determined above.
In considering the charge, and specifically space shuttle capabil-
ities and constraints, the Panel explored in detail Orbiter turnaround
functions and procedures, hardware, software, payloads, propellants,
flight training, general services, and logistics.
The most difficult question to answer in terms of time and flight
estimates concerned contingencies, covering the gamut from minor per-
turbations to meeting flight schedules to major disasters, all of
which are statistically possible but unquantifiable.
The issue of space shuttle utilization and the potential market
for reusable-launch-vehicle payloads was not addressed.
The responses to the charge focus on the 1990 time frame.
The Panel wishes to express its appreciation to the many members
of the NASA staff who provided valuable information for the study and
facilitated the work of the Panel in every way.
Launch Rates for 4 and 5-Orbiter Fleet
In 1986 a parallel line of launch facilities is expected to come on-
line at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and launch and landing facil-
ities are expected to become operational at Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB). The Orbiter fleet, presently consisting of the Columbia
(OV-102) and the Challenger (OV-099), will grow to 4 with the addition
of the Discovery (OV-103), expected to be delivered in late 1983, and
the Atlantis (OV-104) in 1984. The earliest availability of a fifth
Orbiter, if funded in FY 1984, would be 1987.
The determinants that establish the range of annual STS flights
are Orbiter ground turnaround duration; on-orbit flight duration;
routine Orbiter recovery; the number of days and shifts worked per
week; the level of logistics support, including spares; Orbiter down-
time for major periodic maintenance; and flight support functions.
To date, NASA has very limited experience in turnaround of the
Orbiter and no experience on which to base estimates for Orbiter down-
time for major periodic maintenance. Hence, all estimates of Orbiter
fleet capacity are based on program planning and projections of im-
provements in flight hardware design, reductions in requirements,
improvements in ground support equipment, and enhancements to facili-
ties.
The Panel reviewed each of the elements that support the opera-
tions: the production of External Tanks (ET); the recovery and refur-
bishment of the Solid pocket Motors (SRN) and Boosters (SRB); the
ground processing of the Orbiter, including its rocket engines and
subsystems; the integration of the Orbiter, ET, and SRB into a space
shuttle preparatory to movement to the launch pad; and finally, he
logistic systems that support these operations.
These elements and functions are fully discussed in Chapters IV
and V. In the following estimate of normal turnaround time it is
assumed that all components and capabilities, including fuels and
cargo, are available at the time they are needed in the process of
preparing the space shuttle for launch.
5
6TURNAROUND AND LAUNCH RATE ESTIMATES
The Panel examined NASA's space shuttle Orbiter capability studies, as
well as the most current NASA turnaround data and projections. The
phases in the turnaround process from a landing on the KSC Space
Shuttle Landing Facility to the next launch includes tar of the
Orbiter to the Orbiter Preparation Facility for inspection, sainte-
nance, and horizontal cargo loading if required; movement to the
Vehicle Assembly Building for mating with the External Tank and Solid
Rocket Boosters on the Mobile Launch Platform; roll out of the space -
shuttle to the Launch Pad for servicing; vertical cargo loading if
required; checkout, and launch. A detailed discussion of shuttle
turnaround operations is given in Appendix E.
Turnaround Time
Optimistic and conservative time estimates for each step in the turn-
around process are shown in Figure 1 and summarized in Table I for the
1990 timeframe.
TOW
Land at	 Work
Planned	 Dep
Site	 Vehide Assembly Building - 5 Days
Comervad a AI Orbiter Processing Facility -19 Days
Launch Pad -16 Days
	
.40
Vehide Awwnbly Building - 5 Days
OpWWs* A I Orbiter Processing Facility
15 Days
Launch	
.......................28
8 Days
FIGURE 1 Range of Orbiter Turnaround Durations (Circa 1990)
In the breakdown of time in Figure 1 the number of days in the
Vehicle Assembly Building does not change, since the mating, power and
fuel line connection operations can be expected to be relatively rou-
tine and trouble-free, whereas there is clearly a potential for more
extended periods of time in the Orbiter Processing Facility for re-
furbishment, repair, and component replacement, and even longer exten-
sions on the pad associated with preparation for launch.
7Achievement of a 28-day ground turnaround requires NASA to improve
the process at a 70 percent learning rate.* The on-orbit mission
duration of 5 days represents the average of the expected durations
attendant to Spacelab. UoD, and multipayload deployment w;ssions.
This assessmrtit also recognizes the need for Orbiter downtime for
major periodic inspection, and maintenance after every so many
flights. Each STS fligt.t stresses the Orbiter structural and thermal
protection systems such closer to design limits than does a normal
flight for commercial or military aircraft. In light of this fact and
in the absence of experience, NASA's initial estimate of an average of
5 months of downtime after every 25 flights was considered accept-
table. However, this rate should be app.oaehed progressively; i.e.,
major inspection and maintenance should be conducted more frequently
on early flights until confidence is gained. when allowance for the
25/5 downtime is included in the effective availability of an Orbiter,
the operational flights per year per Orbiter are reduced fr,= 7.5 to
about 6.o.
TABLE I Orbiter Flight Capacity
Average Flights
Average	 Major Periodic per Year
Ground	 Mission	 Maintenance	 per Orbiter
Estimate	 Turnaround	 Duration Downtime	 5/33
Conservative 40 work Days 7 Days 	 15/5 140. 1
	4.6
Optimistic
	
28	 5	 25/5 140. 2
	6.6
lAfter every 15 flights an Urbiter is taken down for 5 months for
major periodic maintenance.
2After every 25 flights an Orbiter is taken down for 5 months for
major periodic maintenance.
3Workweek is 5 days and 3 shifts per day.
The conservative case presumes ground turnaround improves to only
40 work days--about an 80 percent learning rate--from current experi-
ence of 94 work days (STS-5). The longer on-orbit duration of 7 days
is based on the expectation that missions might be longer to compen-
sate for fewer flights. Major periodic maintenance and inspection,
*This means that for each doubling of the numbers of launches, only
70 percent of labor hours are required for the later launch.
8assumed to be more frequent, is scheduled to be conducted between
every 15 flights. In this operating mode the average number of
flights per year a single Orbiter can achieve is 4.6, based on a 5-day
workweek. Only about one flight per year per Orbiter is added with a
7-day workweek.
Vandenberg Air Force Base Operations
The Orbiter turnaround durations estimated in Table I are based on KSC
operations and do not apply to VAFB. Differences in launch facilities
between KSC and VAFB constrain the latter to longer Orbiter turnaround
time and, hence, lower utilization of the Orbiters assigned to be
launched at Vandenberg. These differences could not be quantified
because VAFB planning and estimates are in early stages. Initially,
the turnaround at VAFb is projected to be about 60 days---4 to 5
flights per year--which can probably be reduced with time. For pur-
poses of estimating STS fleet capacity, however, the Panel assumed
that the lower utilization of the equivalent of one Orbiter at VAFB
would correspond to 5 flights per year in the optimistic estimate and
4 flights per year in the conservative estimate. The range in space
shuttle fleet capacity for-botb a 4- and 5-Orbiter fleet, accounting
for the possibility of one equivalent Orbiter at VAFB, is shown in
Table II.
TABLE II Space Shuttle Fleet Capacity
Total Flights per Year
5-Day Workweek, 3 Shifts
Estimate	 4-Orbiter Fleet
	 5-Orbiter Fleet
KSC Launch Estimates
Conservative	 18	 23
Optimistic	 26	 33
One Orbiter Equivalent at VAFB
Conservative	 17	 22
Optimistic
	 25	 31
9Workweek Consideratons
As-- the
 
space shuttle operations stabilize and mature, NASA plans to 	 -
move toward a 5-day, 3-shifts-per-day workweek, both to reduce premium
labor costs and to provide schedule buffers to better ensure on-time
launches. With the weekend& set aside, troubleshooting teams can
recover from the schedule delays due to the normal problems attendant
on any operational system. A scheduled 7-workday week was regarded as
inefficient and undesirable for a protracted period because of its
inevitable impact on flight safety.
Estimates of the average number of days of delay per mission for
such reasons as routine vehicle and cargo troubleshooting, anomaly
resolution, and launch holds for weather indicate that weekends may be
required to absorb normal schedule disruptions. The proven ability to
launch payloads on schedule clearly will be of great value to the user
community. Thus, NASA's plan to move toward a 5-day workweek for
space shuttle operations and use weekends for better schedule recovery
appears wise.
IMPACT OF CONTINGENCIES ON FLIGHT RATES
The loss of, or major damage to, a single Orbiter in service or any
number of other unfavorable conditions would preclude reaching esti-
mated flight rates. Contingencies that could cause perturbations to
shuttle scheduling can be placed in two categories--those with major
impact on the schedule but without hazard to the program itself and
major disasters involving hazards to the crew, to major elements of
the flight hardware, or to ground facilities. The latter hazards are
less susceptible to preplanning for recovery because of their possible
safety or political impacts.
Those contingencies most difficult to assess include accidents,
problems arising from contamination, and defense alerts. In addition,
requirements are not known for future major configuration upgrades,
extended missions, or missions requiring specific launch windows and/
or extraordinary cargo preparation. Nevertheless, previous experience
in both airline and military operations suggests contingencies will
arise. The issue here is planning. In cases like this where the size
of the fleet is small, development of a suitable data base to allow
for contingencies is a matter of extreme difficulty.
Needless to say, in a complex system such as the STS there are
many possible situations that might lead to difficulties and damage.
Examples of some such contingencies that might be anticipated are dis-
cussed below.
Main Engine Component Failure
The main engines of the shuttle represent an ambitious approach to the
boundaries of the present state of the art in materials, bearings,
system design, and manufacturing precision and control. The
10
demonstrated short life of this turbopumps (hydrogen and oxygen) and
the recurrent problems in the combustors and nozzle skirts suggest
that a sizable spares program will be required if no major life-
improvement changes are made in these components. A spares and life
improvement program needs to be activated and funded along with RW
programs to improve the life of critical San elements.
The possibility of major damage to the shuttle and to ground test
facilities from engine component failures is high. Thus, th rough
inspection prior to firings and launch, and preservation of existirnR
facilities for main engine testing, are essential to maintain a
predictable launch rate.
Solid Rocket Booster Limitations
The issue of production and refurbishment rates for solid rocket
motors is discussed elsewhere. However, current facilities for
handling and storing propellant segments at RISC limit the flight
rate. The current amount of solid propellant handling within the VAR
is a hazard that limits crew size and therefore launch rate.
Loss of solid propellant cases and attached hardware during
recovery operations has already occurred and probably can be expected
again during high rate operations. This potential loss of hardwire is
compounded by plans for introduction of some light weight, filament
wound cases that will produce a mixed inventory some of which will not
be recovered and some of which may be too heavy for use on certain
flights.
Failure of an Orbiter Major Structural Element
Some of the Orbiter's major structural elements could on occasion be
loaded near or even to the failure limits. As an example, the landing
gear loads my vary significantly because they are functions of
Orbiter landing weight, landing speed, pilot technique and atmospheric
turbulence conditions. The consequence of the failure of a critical
element such as the landing gear could range all the way from minor
repairs to a major accident and schedule delay.
Reduction or Loss of Control Power
The power system for the flight controls (hydraulic power source)
consists of 3 auxiliary power units in the Orbiter and dual install-
ation of similar power units in each Solid Rocket Booster. Although
these light weight hypergolic-fueled hydraulic sources have been
carefully developed and tested, the failure of one or more of these 7
units during a shuttle mission is possible. The results of an in-
flight failure could range from the most probable, reduced control
power with little liability to the schedule, to serious systems or
Orbiter damage with major schedule implications.
qA number of contingencies may cause the Orbiter to land at other than
the planned return site. An example of such a contingency would be
the necessity to divert due to a heavy rainstorm at the landing area.
Such a contingency during high-rate operation will necessitate rapid
retrieval without upoeting planned operations. This may well require
an addition&: Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA, a Boeing 747) and ar-
rangements for transporting the handling and hoisting gear to the
site. Further, there is an element of risk in relying on a single
SCA, especially at higher flight rates, since the SCA itself is sub-
ject to damage or other downtime possibilities.
Other Contingencies with Major. Schedule Impact
1. The loss of any of three major test firing facilities for the
main engine would have a major impact on schedules due to the rate of
certification testing, R&D testing for new elements of the engine, and
routine testing after maintenance and overhaul.
2. Unexpected rain damage to the thermal protection system.
3. A main shuttle engine (SSME) failure that damaged an adjacent
engine or its controls.
4. Failure of gear to extend for landing.
5. A shuttle ditching.
LAUNCH RATE FINDINGS
In the 1990 time frame, the range of the number of annual STS flights,
given a 4- and 5-Orbiter fleet, accounting for normal turnaround time,
is estimated to be:
4-Orbiter fleet
	
17 to 25 flights per year
5-Orbiter fleet
	 22 to 31 flights per year
These estimates are based on fleets operating from both KSC and
VAFS (one equivalent Orbiter) on a 5-workday week, 3-:.hifts-per-day
basis (see Table II). A 5-workday week, which is in NASA's planning,
wisely allows weekends to be used as buffers for schedule delays
caused by normal problems attendant on any operational system.
In these estimates no attempt is made to account for contingencies
such as anomaly- and failure-resolution delays, diverted landings, or
accidents, which are realistic possibilities but cannot be quantified
in any rational sense. These contingencies will reduce the maximum
number of flights in unpredictable ways. However, in a positive vein,
major configuration upgrades and major maintenance improvements may
eventually reduce the downtime.
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Capabilities Required to Support Various Launch bates
Numerous capabilities of various types, some with a very high degree
of complexity and sophistication, are needed to support the space
shuttle. For the purpose of this study, capabilities are divided into
three categories--operations, logistics, and major investment iteas--
and their ability to meet launch rates of 18, 24, 30, and 40 per year
is considered.
Operational functions discussed include launch and landing,
flight, and training of flight crews and ground personnel. Launch and
landing operations deal with the turnaround process and related facil-
ities. The turnaround process is described in Chapter III and Appen-
dix E.
The section on logistics includes a general discussion of space
shuttle logistics support functions, along with the future role of the
U.S. Air Force.
The section on major investment items covers the elements of hard-
ware that make up the Space Transportation. System--Orbiter, Space
Shuttle Main Engine, Solid Rocket Boosters and Motors, and the Exter-
nal Tank--as well as payload preparation and integration.
The present chapter deals with the capability of these operational
elements and supporting facilities to meet the prescribed launch ratef3.
OPERATIONS
Kennedy Space Center Launch and Landing Operations
The estimated launch rate capabilities of the major vehicle processing
facilities at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are shown in Figure 2. The
upper.-dashed portion of the column represents the optimistic flight
rate capability for each facility. The element with the largest un-
certainty in potential is the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP). The MLP
is in continual use from the time of mating the elements of the space
shuttle upon it in the Vehicle Assembly Building, through launch and
subsequent refurbishment. The projected reduction in MLP turnaround
time is highly dependent on the effectiveness of planned improvements
to the flight hardware. To reach a launch rate of 24 flights per year
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ox to support a total STS rate of 30 from both coasts, a fourth
may be required unless the XLP turnaround times can be reduced
w those now pzojected. Similarly, for 32 to 34 flights per year
a KSC, for a total of 40 from both coasts, a fifth MLP will be
Sod.
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ProceWng	 Assembly	 Launch	 Pad	 and
Facility	 Building	 Platform	 Storage
(BAYS)	 (CELLS)	 Facility
FIGURE 2 KSC Space Shuttle Turnaround Facilities
Should a fifth KLP be required, a third Vehicle Assembly Building
(VAB) integration cell would be needed. The latter is believed to be
a major facility demand that has not yet been adequately analyzed.
Other key launch facility requirements include (1) completion of
Launch Pad B by January 1986 and (2) completion of a third firing room
(FR-3) by Oct=ter 1983, with the possible need for a fourth, FR-4.
The crosswind limitations of the Orbiter suggest that an addi-
tional runway should be considered at KSC to avoid diversions to other
landing sites and an accompanying reduction in the total annual flight
rate.
«.
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Flight Operations
Johnsen Space Center is rerponsible for mission operations, planning
and control, and development of the Orbiter. The Center's capability
is limited by a number of factors. The Flight Control Room is a key
element of the Mission Control Center in the preparation for and
conduct of a given mission. Each flight has a unique set of support
functions requiring control center reconfiguration. Such requirements
include communications, launch performance indicators, software modi-
fications (both internal to the Flight Control Room and to the
Orbiter), flight control simulation and training, and a whole set of
payload support activities, again unique to each mission. Supporting
this activity and the flight preparation is a large mission planning
and analysis function that requires considerable lead time for each
flight, depending upon the complexity of the mission.
The USAF plan to utilize, in the near term, the NASA Control
Center for secure DoD missions puts another conf.rraint on the flight
rate. An effort has been Bade to accommodate the DoD mission within
the prese.,t NASA Mission Control facilities until the USAF plans to
build a Shuttle Mission Control Center as part of the Consolidated
Space Operations Center (CSOC) come to fruition. However, the timing
for this control center addition, the scope of its facilities, and the
continued budget restrictions that the USAF faces could put additional
strain on the NASA Control Center. If the CSOC does become a fully
operational facility in the lrter 1980s, it could relieve a pressure
point in STS operations. NA81/DoD management attention is required
now to prevent NASA Control Center facilities from becoming a limiting
factor for the higher launch r:.tes.
Careful attention has been required during the research and
development phase of the STS to ensure reliable software performance.
Although the existing software production computers are adequate to
generate the on-board software that operates and drives the Orbiter,
as flight rates build it will be a major challenge tc%
 provide the
necessary software modifications and flight-to-flight changes.
Further, software verification will necessitate continued vigilance to
prevent hazardous errors from occurring. JSC has i number of plans
formulated to handle the higher flight rate. with reasonable learning
and a continuing effort toward simplification this should not be a
limiting factor.
Training and Mission Control
There appear to be a sufficient number of candidates for astronauts
and flight controllers to reach a rate of 40 flights per year. The
training constraints to support this rate are facilities. These
facilities include the Shuttle Mission Simulator, the Guidance and
Navigation Simulator, Mission Control Center, the water Immersion
Facility, and "1-G mock-ups" of the Orbiter cabin. As indicated in
Figure 3, a major limiting training element is the number of Shuttle
Training Aircraft (STA). JSC currently has 2 STAB and approval for a
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third. This trainer is used for terminal -area and landing-approach
flight training. The potential growth shown in Figure 3 is based on a
reduction in the number of landings required for proficiency. The STA
is a modified Gulfs±ream II. Because of its unique flight control
system and aerodynamic shaping, great stress is placed on the airframe
structure. The flight time requirements for crew training and the
attendant lifetime restrictions on the aircraft make it a constraint.
A fourth aircraft is seen as essential to support combined NASA and
DoD requirements for 40 flights a year.
--,;_; Range of Potential Capability
Existing Facilities
Flight Control	 Simulators	 Software	 Shuttle Training
Room
	
Production
	 Ai rcraf t
Facility
Computers
FIGURE 3 Training and Mission Control Capabilities (1989-1990)
Another constraining element is the Shuttle Mission SimulatoL,
which NASA believes to be adequate for 24 to 30 flights per year.
This equipment must be augmented by USAF or NASA facilities to achieve
40 flights per year. CSOC training facilities, it designed to support
the unique DoD requirement for mission specialists, flight controller,
and mission support personnel training may provide this augmentation
(Figure 3). In any case the CSOC real time mission control facilities
will be needed due to unique military requirements over ar' z Kove STS
control.
3	
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LOGISTICS
The term "logistics" is defined as the entire spectrum of activity
required to support the buildup of the shuttle program to achieve
increased launch rates and to maintain those rates over time. It
includes, but is not limited to, planning, determination of require-
ments, budgeting, contractor selection, procurement, contract admin-
istration, acquisition, facility construction, spares provisioning,
part storage and issue, modifications, refurbishment, maintenance,
repair, disposal of excess material, and all related management
c
information and communications. The NASA Centers share responsi-
bilities for the total shuttle program, with extensive dependence on
`_•	 numerous contractors.
As the shuttle program has progressed, KSC has absorbed more
overall responsibility in the logistics support area. Central to this
is the future contract for a single Shuttle Processing contractor
(SuC), which is being competed by KSC. Recent overall NASA STS
organizational changes have set a trend away from the traditional
research ane development type of operation toward an airline or weapon
system support set of procedures designed to sustain flight operations.
Early budget contraints required that NASA give priority to
meeting initial launch dates to the detriment of long-term operational
considerations. The money apparently was not available for up-front
procurement of an engineering database, reprocurement data, program-
ming factors, sufficient spares, and overall management information.
As a rezlilt, no coherent, long-range maintenance or spares provision-
ing plan has been instituted.
Only recently, senior NASA managemen 4-cognized the philosophical
change required. They have moved into place or recruited recognized
experts in logisti(-Z to include those skilled in planning, acquisi-
tion, supply, maintenance, and repair. These individuals have done
excellent work in preparing an initial foundation for what must
follow. In addition, formal entree has been made to the USAF main-
tenance and supply support system. This in turn provides access to
Navy, Army, and Defense Logistics Agency support activities.
In spite of the myriad of contractors involved, there seems to be
no significant case in which NASA can invoke competition to improve
costs. The result is a major dependence for replenishment or repair
on former vendors who may have had to severely curtail operations or
may be out of business, and on sole source procurement. In addition,
as launch rates increase and Orbiter production winds down, the need
for replacement parts will rise while production capacity diminishes
or, indeed, disappears. Also, there are vehicle configuration
differences and extensive variations between eastern and western
launch site facilities.
The potential for logistics support problems exists. Althougr
NASA has sought to be prudent in scheduling periodic inspection and
maintenance at reasonable levels, it is difficult to predict what the
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proper rates should be. Earlier heavy maintenance may become neces-
sary, or the first scheduled depot level inspection may disclose major
repair requirements that cannot be put off for the rest of the Orbiter
fleet.
In addition, the launch sites are exposed to environments where
corrosion is severe. Even though STS post and preflight inspections
are intense, the very nature of the equipment makes it difficult to be
confident of inspecting all critical areas adequately. There is some
potential for unscheduled requirements for large-scale replacement of
parts or extensive repair.
The U.S. Air Force Role
The USAF role in the shuttle program is essentially that of a user.
Through a traditional USAF System Program Office, its contributions
are the construction of a western launch site facility at Vandenberg
Air Force Base; development and production o° an inertial upper stage
to take payloads up to high geosynchronous orbiv from a shuttle in low
earth orbit, and DoD payload integration responsibilities. The latter
includes construction of a Shuttle Payload Integration Facility at
KSC/CCASF (Cape Canaveral Air Force Station).
The NASA/USAF effort to reduce rising vendor depot-level repair-
costs is assigned to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center of the Air
Force Logistics Command (AFLC). The plan is to identify AFLC-wide
depot industrial base capabilities that have potential as second
repair sites, but the process is slow. It should be noted that the
character of the shuttle program--few vehicles, unique hardware, and
questionable continuity of the production base--represents a departure
from the usual logistics center operation.
Need for Logistics Planning
In summary, while NASA has taken positive steps toward developing the
kind of organization required to support planned launch rates, logis-
tics difficulties may well pose serious obstacles to achieving those
rates. These problems may manifest themselves not as a shortage of
major investment items such as the ET or SRB, but rather as an in-
ability to provide timely repair or replacement of parts needed to
sustain launch site refurbishment and demanding Orbiter turnaround
times. A coherent maintenance and spares plan has not been insti-
tuted. Many critical commodities are already subject to a diminishing
manufacturing base, only waiting for crises to identify them.
Unknowns in the results to be expected from launch site corrosion,
vehicle stresses, and environmental extremes may cause serious delays
to schedules. The number of flight articles is marginal for the lower
launch rates and provides no backup for the higher launch rates.
Cannibalization will. not compensate for lack of spares at higher
launch rates.
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DoD depot repair support will increase but will be of limited
overall assistance. Improvement will require management action to
include better definition of individual NASA organizational logistics
support reponsibilities, more direct access by senior NASA logis-
ticians to top management, and hard budget decisions to promptly
provide needed long-term support for the shuttle program.
MAJOR INVESTMENT ITEMS
Major investment items include the Orbiter itself with its maintenance
and basic spares program, the Space Shuttle Main Engine, the Solid
Rocket Booster and Moor, the External Tank, and payload preparation
and integration. These items are discussed below with the exception
of the External Tank and the specific questions regarding it that were
posed to the Panel, which are dealt with separately in Chapter V.
Orbiter
Orbiter turnaround considerations arE treated in Chapter III. Orbiter
maintenance and reconfiguration activities are carried out in the
Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) which has 2 bays. Flight rates in
excess of 30 per year will require the addition of a third. Orbiter
maintenance and spares, and concerns regarding production stoppage,
are discussed in the following sections.
Orbiter Maintenance Over the years, the airlines have learned that if
an airplane fleet is to be continued safely in scheduled operation at
high utilization rates for many years and many thousands of hours, a
planned maintenance program must be developed.
If the Orbiter vehicles are each to be used for 100 or more mis-
sions, and future constraints on launch rates are 1-0 be minimized, a
maintenance program needs to be thoughtfully developed at an early
date. It should be designed to ensure that constraints do riot develop
in the future because of downtime required for safety modifications or
caused by component, structural, or system failures and repairs. The
best flight rates can be achieved if limited modifications can be in-
corporated at regularly scheduled downtimes.
As an example, major periodic maintenance and inspection of each
Orbiter Vehicle (OV) is planned after 25 missions, with an estimated
downtime of 5 months. Orbiter flights should be scheduled so that not
more than one vehicle is down for service at any one time, with some
leeway for unexpected downtime requirements.
There is concern that the 25-flight limit for major maintenance is
arbitrary. While early experience with the first 5 flights was very
good, it would appear wise to work up progressively to the 25-flight
limit. This is the procedure developed by the airlines, with the
concurrence of the FAA and the airframe manufacturers. While heavy
maintenance services for widebodied jet transports in long use are
(
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currently set for about 25,000 hours, a new design transport is
generally scheduled for heavy maintenance and inspection at less than
10,000 hours (9,000 for the B 747). If experience is satisfactory
with the first few airplanes so inspected, the airlines extend the
period in stages to 25,000 hours. The current layup of OV 102 and its
planned layup next year should be used to accumulate and document such
experience. It may be prudent as well to schedule a major inspection
of another vehicle after approximately 15 flights.
In summary, if future constraints on launch rates because of
maintenance requirements are to be avoided, a planned maintenance
program should be developed promptly and carried into operation.
Basic Spares Program Because of the complexity of the R&D program
itself, and the problems apparently imposed by budget ceilings, the
spares programs and the planning of facilities for major maintenance
of shuttle elements have lagged seriously. This situation exists for
nearly all components and systems, as well as for instrumentation,
test hardware, and ground equipment.
Concerns About Production Stoppage In assessing fleet capacity, the
Paul became concernea with the ability to make major repairs or
modifications during a period when the Orbiter production capability
was not active. The ability to bring tooling out of storage, re-
certify it and the necessary personnel, acquire materials, fabricate,
test, qualify, and deliver a major replacement such as a wing, while
not technically in question, poses a potentially serious scheduling
problem. For example, NASA and contractor estimates to repair/replace
a wing are on the order of 6 months if the production base is in place
and 36 months if it is not. The latter would clearly cause a severe
setback in STS operations.
Space Snuttle !lain Engine (SSME)
The SSME represents a major advance in rocket engine technology and
its development continues to exhibit many problems. while the service
record on the 5 flights of the OV 102 was excellent, serious diffi-
culties were experienced with the next set of engines. The basic SSME
program plan provides for 19 flight engines, 12 to be installed in
Orbiters and 7 to be available as spares. However, current avail-
ability of spare pumps and engines appears critical and will remain so
until well into 1984. NASA already has had to resort to parts canni-
balization to meet test and operational schedules.
The present planned total of 19 engines appears barely adequate to
support 24 missions per year, even assuming that removal rates do not
become excessive. The 19 engines should be available by late 1985,
whereas the 24-mission schedule does not commence until late 1987. If
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by 1987 the total removal rate exceeds 0.1 (1 removal per 10 engine
cycles, 1 flight - 3 engine cycles), and the out-of-service time is
not reduced materially, more spare engines will be needed.
Little background exists on which to base removal rate estimates,
and therefore little is known about spares requirements. The removal
of three engines from OV 099 implies a current removal rate of 0.4. A
more thorough study of probable removal rates, planned service devel-
opment of the engines and pumps, overhaul programs, etc., appears to
be in order.
While the SSME service record on Columbia is encouraging, the plan
to operate all 3 engines on OV 099 for 20 missions prior to removal
for overhaul is less than conservative--especially in light of
contemplated operation at higher thrust levels, and the fact that 10
successive simulated cycles at the higher thrust levels have yet to be
achieved on the test stand, and there are no teardown inspection data
that describe wear. It is suggested that engine removals from OV 099
be staggered, perhaps 1 at 10 cycles, and depending upon the engire's
appearance, 1 at 15 and the third at 20. Such a sequence would:
1. Enable NASA to take advantage of the knowledge gained from
earlier overhauls to define the life extension more accurately.
2. Decrease exposure to potential multiple failures since
installed engines would not have the same age. Similarly, the
probability of multiple deterioration of thrust, temperature control,
an_9/or fuel consumption would be decreased.
3. Smooth out the flow through the engine overhaul shop, with
beneficial effects on overhaul costs and spare engine availability.
Preliminary schedules for the planned engine overhaul program made
available to the Panel show periods when no engines would be in the
shop for as long as two years. This could result in the loss of ex-
perienced overhaul personnel and increased costs. With SL-;h a program
it is questionable whether there would be sufficient reserve capacity
for emergencies, such as multiple engine replacement.
The times scheduled for overhaul appear excessive. Engines from
OV 102 are scheduled in overhaul for 18 months or more. Later engines
are scheduled for slightly more than a year. Elimination of schedule
gaps could favorably influence the.time required for each individual
overhaul. The present practice of shipping engines to California for
overhaul and then to the National Space Technology Laboratories (NSTL)
in Louisiana for tests will impede the availability of engines at
higher flight rates. Consideration should eventually be given to
locating an engine ground test facility at the launch site. Tne Panel
recognizes this represents a major investment, however.
The high pressure fuel and oxidizer pumps appear more critical
than the engine as a whole with respect to removal rates. Since these
are replaceable with the engine in place on the Orbiter, sufficient
additional spares should be available to support vehicle launch and
projected pump unit removal rates. It is equally_ important that a
coherent overhaul program be developed for these pumps.
i
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There are indications that flight hardware spares are inadequate
to support even current launch rates. 	 These items include not only
the pumps and turbines, but also the injectors.
A potential facility constraint associated with the SSNE concerns
test stands.	 There are three test stands, A-1 and A-2 at NSTL and A-3
at Santa Susanna, near Rocketdyne. 	 The two at NSTL are used for
normal testing and certification of engines as well as 'green running"
equipment such as liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen pumps. 	 Test stand
A-3 is used in a similar fashion but also in development testing of
modifications in hardware. 	 It is an important adjunct to `-he other
two and, at the current engine removal rate, should be kept in oper-
ation.
While qualification of the hardware to provide 109 percent of the
full power level {FPL) is proceeding, such still needs to be accom-
plished.	 The high speed turbo machinery (high pressure fuel turbopump
and high pressure oxygen turbopump) is limited to a range of 2000 to
3000 seconds of operation and will not achieve the life requirement of
55 flights per engine.
	 Development problems still exist, for example,
in turbine bearing and blade life. 	 The 'sub-synchronous whirl" phe-
nomenon is not totally understood and this say restrict attempts to
push the engine to higher performance in the future. 	 The full-scale
main propulsion test requiring 3 engines firing at full power is a
milestone to be achieved and presents a challenge to shuttle manage-
went.	 •
history has shown that hardware is often consumed during test =
programs and, in this respect, the hardware limits of the present
production scheme may well represent a constraint. 	 Finally, the Panel
empnasizes the newness of the technologies and operations involving
the main engines and recognizes that development of this portion of
the STS must continue beyond most other components. 	 It may be of
interest to note that historically, air transport engine manufacturers
have budgeted half of their development costs to be applied after an
engine is put into service.
Solid Rocket Booster (SRS)
The SRB has yet to reach the production and refurbishment rate neces-
sary for 18 flights a year.
SRS Refurbishment and Assembly The retrieval, disassembly, refurbish-
ment, and reassembly of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRS) structural sub-
systems (exclusive of the Solid Rocket Motor cases) is performed at
KSC and the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CY:AFS). Appendix F
shows stages of SRB refurbishment. This activity currently takes
place in the following facilities:
Retrieval	 Two recovery ships
Disassembly	 hangar AF (CCAFS)
Parachute facility 	 KSC industrial area
MRefurbishment
Assembly and
storage
`3
Hangars AF i H and the VAS
VAB and planned PSF (Processing and
Storage facility)
Because of the limited experience from the first 6 launcnes, there
is considerable uncertainty as to the eventual launch rates that the
current tooling, processes, and facilities will support. overall, the
refurbishment tasK is significantly greater than originally planned
because the aft structure (skirt), thrast vector control actuators,
and auxiliary power units have experienced more extensive water impact
damage than expected. Several design modifications have already been
incorporated to improve this situation, and others are planned.
The following is a list of concerns and future requirements ac-
cording to Marshall Space Flight Center, United Space Boosters, Inc.
(USBI) and Thiokol representatives:
1. A new $9 million, large-area building at the Solid Racket
Motor contractors' facility is needed to allow rocket segments to be
poured without interruption by inclement weather.
2. Current ad hoc arrangements at KSC will not support increased
flight rates. A new refurbishment facility is necessari to disas-
semble, clean, repair and reassemble the forward and ait skirt
portions of the SRB. USBI has proposed to finance and build at Cape
Canaveral such a facility with a planned 24-per-year flight rate--with
potential for expansion. NASA currently has under study several
alternative facility concepts. These include consolidating the
disassembly and refurbishment activities into new or expanded facil-
ities at or near KSC. Transferring the operation to Marshall Space
Flight Center is also under consideration. Planning and budgets
support flight rates up to only 16 per year in the present refur-
bishment and production facilities. The tooling and facility planning
for rates of 24 per year with expansion capacity up to 40 is under-
way. These facilities must be in place and sufficient spares on hand
by mid-1987 to support 24 flights per year in 1988.
3. The recovery operation is a formidable one but has operated
effectively to date, with the exception of a parachute mechanism
failure.
4. Reuse of rocket cases and other hardware is essential to meet
the schedule. however, sufficient spares must be available in the
event of losses or extensive damage. The long-term effects of cor-
rosion and erosion have not been fully assessed.
5. Aft skirts are in snort supply, and current refurbishment and
production rates will not meet the 24-per-year launch rate. The
extent to which the aft skirts are damaged upon recovery suggests more
of these items are needed.
6. The filament wound case being developed for use on special
perrormance missions appears to be on schedule. However, the mixed
inventory of metal and filament wound casings may require stockpiling
extra segments to achieve logistic integrity.
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In summary, the Panel found reason to doubt that the existing SRS
facilities would be able to support flight rates above-l6-per year.
Both NASA and the contractor are acutely aware of the uncertainties
and over the past year have assessed more than 10 options. The
specific configuration of refurbishment and production facilities is
expected to be agreed upon in 1983.
Refurbishment of Motor Only (SRM) The SON is the largest Solid Rocket
Motor ever flown and the first designed for reuse. Solid Rocket Motor
..	 case refurbishment and recasting is performed within contractor-owned
facilities. The planning and budgeting is in place for both
contractor- and NASA-provided equipment  forpreach ng a rate capability
of 24 flights per year. Implementation will be completed in 1987.
For rates above this level the tooling and facilities requirements
gave been identified and, in keeping with the past practice wherein
the contractor capitalizes nonseverable tooling and facilities and
NASA funds severable tooling, the budget estimates have been forau-
lated.
However, the SRM segments are transported by rail to and from Utah
for refurbisnment and recasting. If the assumed 7 days in transit
each way for propellant segments is exceeded, additional segments and
spares will be required in the system.
Another potential constraint to SRH production above 24 flights
per year may rest not with the SRH prime contractor but with the
suppliers of ammonium perchlorate. Currently, the production of this
major propellant Ingredient is being expanded by the only two sup-
pliers in the nation to stet the expected demand in the near future.
If a rate above 24 flights per year is sought, either a new )plant or
further expansion will be . required. Hence ammonium Perchlorate could
constrain the STS until there is capitalization for higher production.
Payload Preparation and Integration
The operational phase of the STS introduces a host of new factors in
preparing and integrating the payloads, or cargo, to be transported
into space. Varied payloads, multiple customers (some with limited
space experience), coping with late changes, the need for safety and
security, and the requirement for quicker processing and operations!
efficiency all combine to present the STS managers with substantial
challenges.
The customers who will fund and provide payloads for STS include
NASA, DoD, and commercial enterprises (both domestic and foreign).
Priorities for assignment are as follows:
o NASA security missions for DoD
o Major NASA science missions (e.g., space telescope)
o Commercial missions (domestic and foreign treated equally)
o Other U.S. government missions
)
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NASA Headquarters is responsible for establishing iwiicies
relating to payload preparation and integration and for negotiat
launch service agreements with customers. JSC is responsible fc
flight safety and for the technical interface with customers lea
to publication of the payload integration plan. KSC is responsi
for the ground safety of the payloads from their arrival at KSC
they are launched on the orbiter.
The STS provides an environment that is substantially more benign
than that of the expendable launch vehicles. However, increased
interface complexity results from mixed payloads, the safety require-
ments necessary for a manned vehicle, and the security needs of DOD.
This complexity will be eased as the STS is better defined and
understood and in time should be offset by the increased reliability
of the shuttle.
Payload processing at KSC is now done by NASA and the Air Force in
o^)vernment facilities. These facilities are inadequate to handle the
throughput and if not substantially augmented will present a major
limitation to annual flight rates. For example, only one of the two
cells in the Vertical Processing Facility is fully operational. Full
utilization of the second cell would be needed to reach a flight rate
of 24 per year.
In anticipation of a rapidly increasing requirement for payload
processing, NASA ha3 programmed funds to improve existing facilities
and has plans to add new ones. It is imperative that this construc-
tion program continue at the scheduled pace. Further, the adequacy of
this effort should be reevaluated as operational experience is gained.
In addition to the planned enhancement of NASA payload processing
facilities, two commercial contractors are exploring privately-owned
facilities for this purpose. The Panel assumes the Air Force will
continue to process DoD payloads both at KSC and Vandenberg AFB and
will supply the facilities to maintain the flight rate.
Once the payloads are processed for launch at KSC they are trans-
ported in a payload canister transporter. At present, there is only
one such vehicle but a necessary second is planned. Payloads can be
inserted into the Orbiter payload bay either horizontally while the
Orbiter is in the Orbiter Processing Facility or vertically after the
Orbiter is on the launch pad.
In addition to the problems discussed above, particular attention
should be given to the length of time required for processing, for
handling hazardous cargo, and for coping with payload changes.
At present, 4 months are allowed for payload processing after
arrival at KSC. NASA should work vigorously toward the planned
reduction of this time to 2 months and preferably less. Present NASA
mission planning documents show it could take as long as 9 months to
cope with a significant change in mission payload. This inflexibility
is undesirable, and stringent efforts by NASA are needed to meet or
better the planned goal of a 3-montn maximum.
In summary, planning for payload processing and integration for
the operational STS is demanding. However, NASA, Air Force, and
industry have all devoted considerable time and effort to this matter,
and approved programs, if funded and completed on schedule, should
E
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provide adequate capability. Care should be taken in the provision of
facilities and ground equipment to prevent payload preparation and
integration from becoming a limiting factor at the higher shuttle
flight rates not under consideration.
IM.
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External Tank Produdion
The expendable External Tank (ST) is the component of the space
shuttle that supplies propellants to the Orbiter's main engines. It
is produced for MASA at the Michoud Assembly Facility (Nhr) under
contract with Martin Marietta Aerospace Co. The current production
rate is 13 tanks per year, with the probable capability of 18 per
year. Plans have been made for facilities an W3 tooling to meet a
production rate of 24 tanks per year by 1987 and for eventual ex-
pansion to rates of 30 and then 40 per year.
FACILITY COMFIGUMATIOU
External Tank production is undertaken in one large main manufacturing
facility--the 43-acre Building 103--and several smaller facilities,
all of which were in existence and served prior uses at Michoud.
Existing on-site reinforced foundations in Building 103 were used for
the heavy assembly and welding tools. Because of the need to increase
production rates and streamline the flow of tanks through the plant,,
it is necessary to relocate some of the large major tools and to
transfer some of the thermal protection system (TPS) activities to a
new, auxiliary site.
This major new facility, costing $15 million, is presently being
prepared and will remove the application of the super light ablator
(SLA) from the main building. This will provide added space in
Building 103 for application of the other type of thermal protection,
a low density spray-on foam insulation (SOFI) at an accelerated
rate.* The move will also bte;F avoid contamination from the silicone
*The SLA is bonded to certain kcal areas of the External Tank for
protection against high heating in regions of its interface with the
Orbiter and SRBs and from engine exhaust. The SOFI is sprayed over
the entire external surface of the tank primarily to prevent ice
formation due to the low temperature of its liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen contents.
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used in manufacturing the SLA and will help cz..Lrol the environmental
conditions for application of the SOPI. The building as being der-
signed to accommodate future expansion for rates above 24 per year.
It appears that sufficient space is available within Puilding 103 to
sustain an eventual assembly of 40 tanks per year.
Table III and Figure 4 include estimates of additional facility
and tooling requirements with associated costs for production rates of
24, 30, and 40-tanks per year along with the projected dates of avail-
ability for then rates. No major changes in facility concept or
manufacturing p resses are anticipated for rates above 24 per year.
Modifications to existing facilities (Table III and Figure 4) will be
required, along with major investment in tooling (Table III). The
budget additions (Table III) for the planned rate of 24 per year will
appear in the fiscal years 1984 through 1987.
IMPACT Of INCREMENTAL PRODUCTION INCREASES
There appears to be no major advantage in immediately funding facil-
ities and tools for a flight rate of 40 per year. As shown on Table
III, an increase in production from 24 per year to 30 per year and
finally 40 per year involves only progressive improvements to the
facilities.
In addition to delaying the financial outlay by proceeding in
stages, benefits may be gained by (1) the effects on future manu-
facturing processes of on-going learning experiences, and (2) a
potentially significant adaptation of robotics to Michoud ET pro-
duction.
FINDINGS
To date there has been good E? production experience, and schedules_.
are being met; vendors ars in place for 24-per-year capability and
higher as required; the tooling and facilities needed to reach various
production rates are understood. The Panel could discern no major
constraints to producing quality tanks at rates of 24, 30, or 40 per
year if resources are provided to allow for proper lead times in
tooling, material, and plant accommodations. The only reservaticn
expressed by the Panel members concerned transportation to the launch
site, particularly the plan to ship two tanks per barge to the west
Coast via the Panama Canal. A degree of stockpiling at Vandenberg was
recommended to avoid a deterrent to launch on demand.
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Summary and Conclusions
In assessing the constraints on space shuttle launch rates, the Panel
considered separately the components of the space shuttle and the
potential capabilities to meet various flight rates, as well as the
supporting facilities and services. In addition to these capabili-
ties, major contingencies were considered (Chapter III). Such major
contingencies cannot be quantified, and it must be understood that the
following estimates of STS capabilities will be reduced by any such
occurrence.
LAUNCH RATES
The basis for estimates of launch rates, hardware requirements, and
other capabilities is limited because there is little experience in
space shuttle turnaround, no experience regarding major Orbiter
maintenance, and the operations at Vandenberg are still in the plan-
ning stages. Thus, as discussed in preceding chapters, the following
assumptions were made ir providing the Panel's assessments: (1) the
equivalent of one Orbiter is dedicated to VAFB-launched missions, (2)
no contingencies occur that would take an Orbiter out of service
beyond the 5 months for maintenance scheduled after every 15 (conser-
vative estimate) to 25 (optimistic estimate) missions, (3) mission
duration averages 5 to 7 days, and (4) work is accomplished on a
5-workday/3-shift schedule, allowing weekends to recover from schedule
delays. Based on the above assumptions, the broad range of the number
of annual STS flights in the 1990 timeframe is estimated to be 17 to
25 flights per year for a 4-Orbiter fleet and 22 to 31 for a 5-Orbiter
fleet.
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CAPABILITIES OF MAJOR STS COMPOHMTS
The capabilities of components of the space stiuttle to meet various
launch rates are shown in Figure 5.
X
biter
eet
 Size
4	 5	 6
18 OK OK OK OK Mf OK
24 M OK OK Mt X2 OK
30 X M OK X X OK3
36 X X M X X OK3
40 X X X X X OK3
M - marginal
X - impossible or highly improbable
iwith existing production/refurbishrnent facilities
2options for SRB being studied
3firm plans exist to meet increased production requirements
Longer missions and/or major mishaps decrease the potential number of yearly launches
FIGURE 5 Capabilities of STS Components to Meet Various Launch Rates
5- to 7-Day Mission Duration
Several conclusions may be drawn from this figure:
1. For the 24 missions per year now planned, a minimum of 4
Orbiters is essential. In the event of extended mission duration,
more frequent repair, longer overhaul periods, or contingencies that
incapacitate an Orbiter for a prolonged period, the number of yearly
launches may be reduced significantly below 24.
2. The External Tank appears to be the only major component of
the STS for which firm planning is in place to attain levels of 24,
30, and 40 flights per year. As discussed in Chapter V, no major
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technology advances or changes in production procedures axe required
to provide quality tanks at the required launch rates. The Panel has
no reason-to believe that the schedules cannot be set.
3. Solid Rocket Booster requirements must be derived from
experience, but estimates indicate that a minimum of 24 aft skirts
would be required for sustaining 24 flights per year (20 are x w
planned), and 40 will be needed for 40 flights p--r year. Neither
quantity allows for attrition. Similar increases in forward skirts
and aft propulsion segments should be expected.
The planning is not in place and procedures remai.i to be developed
to refurbish Solid Rocket Boosters to meet the mission model. In
addition, because of the extent to which the aft &i forward skirts of
the SRB may be damaged in recovery from the ocean, tke mixed inventory
of metal and filament wound casings, and the lack :,1 experience re-
garding life expectancy of many SR8 parts, the Panel encourages a
heavy spares policy.
Refurbishment and recasting of the Soli' rocket Motor segments by
the contractor appeareu from the briefings _P Panel received to be
proceeding without significant problems.
4. Space Shuttle Main Engine quantities riow planned for opera-
tions and spares--19 in all--are considered marginal to support 24
flights per year. Even this rate will not be reached unless major
spares programs are instigated, particularly for the high pressure
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxyge:s turbopumps. The Panel anticipates
the SSME will continue under development for many years and that the
above turbopumps may have to be redesigned for longer life.
FACILITIES SUPPORTING FLIGHT OPERATIONS
The development of the STS to an efficient system requires controlled
expansion of its support facilities to achieve increased launch rates
in a cost-effective way. Figure 6 presents a summary of the facility
requirements, discussed in Chapter IV, as a function of the yearly
shuttle launch rate for 11 major STS operational facilities. The
estimates are based on the best judgment of the Panel members in light
of past experience and information received from NASA and relevant
contractors.
The existing and already-funded facilities will now accommodate
about 18 launches per year, but to reach 24 launches some additions
are required--Mobile Launch Platform, Processing and Storage Facility,
and Vertical Processing Facility. To achieve 30 launches per year,
significant additions are required for most of the 11 facilities, and
all need additions to reach the 40 per year launch rate. It should be
noted that many of the facility requirements are directly dependent
upon the STS turnaround time.
1
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FIGURE 6 Capabilities Supporting STS Operations (Cells or Units).
LOGISTICS, i?lAINTENANCE AND SPARES
The STS has done remarkably well on its first 5 flights, and since the
long-term spares and maintenance program requirements sbould be based
on experience, it is not surprising that a coherent spares and main-
tenance program is just developing. Operation of the SIS in an effi-
cient and routine manner demands that strong emphasis be placed on
providing adequate spares and on a systematic maintenance and logis-
tics policy. Inevitably, such a program must address the need for
retaining elements of the Orbiter production line to permit reasonable
replacement of all key component parts as required. This is particu-
larly critical for the production of very long lead time elements of
the Orbiter structure and systems.
The Panel reemphasizes that the complexity of the STS systems, the
R&D nature of present flight experience, and the mixed status of the
c.
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supplier base all demand that experienced attention be given to
developing the logistics of the system, to making sound estimates of
maintenance needs, and to developing an adequate spares_ program.
Budget limitations and R&D pressures have suppressed the development
of these support programs in the past. This leads the Panel to sug-
gest that the most prominent constraints to launch rates in the early
growth of the STS as an operational system may manifest themselves not
as a shortage of major investment items such as the ET or SRB, but
rather as an inability to provide timely repair or replacement of
flight system components needed to sustain launch rates.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The first 6 flights of the space shuttle were successful and stand as
a credit to NASA and the national effort behind it.
Because of very strict budgetary constraints in the space shuttle
program NASA has had to concentrate on the near-term needs, and its
capacity to deal with the longer-term requirements was inevitably cur-
tailed.
Of particular concern to the Panel are the implications of a shut-
down of STS production and the attendant loss of skills, tooling, and
contract manufacturing capabilities in general. Reinitiation of STS
production lines at a later date becomes a formidable task. Not only
will costs be higher but production lead times will be considerably
longer--e.g., the lead time for an Orbiter wing increases from 6 to 36
months--and there may be a need to requalify a high percentage of the
STS systems.
The success of the space shuttle's operational future is dependent
on its cost effectiveness and on the timely availability and proper
functioning of an extensive and complex array of facilities, compo-
nents, and services requiring long-term planning.
.T _0. 0
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Appendix A
LETTER DATED OCTOBER 27, 1982, FROM THE
HONORABLE EDWARD P. BOLAND, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HONORABLE JAKE GARN, U.S. SENATE
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October 27, 1982
Mr. James M. Beggs
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Mr. Beggs:
We are writing in response to your September 13, 1982 request to reprogram
$15 million of rY 82 R&D funds for the purpose of building a new super light
ablator (SLA) facility at Michoud and modifying the existing SLA facility.
The Appropriations Committees are interested in examining additional production
options in order to assure the availability of external tanks to meet realistic
shuttle flight rate requirements. As you are well aware, this is an issue of
consiierable national importance which may affect U.S. capabilities in space
for the next decade and beyond.
As we have done in the past, we would like to request that NASA call upon
the National Research Council (NRC), Committee on NASA Program Reviews, to
examine the implications of this proposed action.
Specifically, we request that the following information be provided by the
NRC:
1. An estimate of the range of the number of annual STS flights.
given a four- and five-orbiter fleet, accounting for normal
turn around time and contingencies.
2. M overview of the capabilities needed to support these estimated
flight rates including rates of 18. 24, 30 and 40 a year with a
survey of known constraints or limiting factors.
3. An estimate of the facility modifications and requirements needed
to match production of external tanks to the above annual shuttle
flight rates. including consideration of learning curve effects.
4. M estimate. based on available data, of the costs associated
with the external tank facility modifications including any
additional costs that might be incurred by modifying the facility
to first support 24 flights a year and them later increasing the
capability to support a higher flight rate.
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S. In estimate of the date that external task production would be
available to support each of the flight rates dttemotned above.
Ye would appmd ate your cooperation in forwarding this request and in
porassisting with the study. A st cam nl these issues should be available
to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees by Apri1 22. IM.
Sincerely.
Eduard P. Boland
	
Jake Qarn
Chairman	 Choi nma
House Subcommittee on WD-	 Senate Subcommittee an NID-
Independent Agencies	 Indepeadent Agencies
cc: Dr. Frank Press
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Appendix C
STATEMENT OF TASK
AN ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRAINTS ON SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH RATES WITH
EMPHASIS ON EXTERNAL TANK PRODUCTION
The National Academy of Sciences/National Academy of Engineering
through the National Research Cor.ncil contracted to furnis_i the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, through the NASA Chief
Engineer, an assessment of Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates
with Emphasis on External Tank Production in response to Congressional
request. This study is the third task under a broader contractual
arrangement with NASA to provide Congress with NRC reviews of proposed
changes in NASA programs. The request issued by letter dated October
27, 1982, from Senator Garn and Congressman Boland to NASA
Administrator James Beggs asked for the following information which
constitutes the charge, with a report to be available to the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees by April 22, 1983:
1. An estimate of the range of the number of annual STS flights,
given a four- and five-orbiter fleet, accounting for normal
turn around time and contingencies.
2. An overview of the capabilities needed to support these
estimated flight rates including rates of 18, 24, 30 and 40 a
year with a survey of known constraints or limiting factors.
3. An estimate of the facility modifications and equirements
needed to match production of external tanks to the above
annual shuttle flight rates, including consideration of
learning curve effects.
4. An estimate, based on available data, of the costs associated
with the external tank facility modifications including any
additional costs that might be incurred by modifying the
facility to first support 24 flights a year and then later
increasing the capability to support a higher flight rate.
5. An estimate of the date that external tank production would be
available to support each of the flight rates determined above.
To deal with the request for carrying out reviews of NASA
programs, the NRC established the Committee on NASA Scientific and
Technological Program Reviews. In order to address diverse problems,
the Committee has been authorized to establish ad hoc review panels,
of which this--the panel to assess constraints on space shuttle launch
rates--is the third.
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In carrying out this assessment, account should be taken of recent
M studies associated with cemqxonent and operational aspects of the
space shuttle.
In regard to the charge, the panel is asked to:
1. Consider throughout only a four- and five-orbiter fleet,
taking in4:o account orbiter availability dates, turnaround,
maintenance and refurbishment requirements.
2. With respect to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the charge use as a
maximum laugh rate per year the answer to paragraph 1 of the
charge= if it is 31, then use launch r:,tes of 18, 24, and 32
in response to paragraph 2 in lieu :.f the 18, 24, 30, and 40
indicated; if it is 36, then use 18, 24, 30, and 36.
3. Address elements of the Space Transportation System including
payload handling and integration, but excluding payload
availability.
4. Provide an overview of capabilities and constraints based upon
available data, including the relation of external tank
production to shuttle launch rates.
5. Consider tooling and other R&D expenditures as well as facility
requirements in responding to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the charge.
It is expected that on-site visits to both the external tank
production facilities and the }apace shuttle launch area will be
necessary.
It is understood that NASA will provide information and data on
program plans, production, operations, schedules and costs associeted
with space shuttle components and launch rates.
It is requested that the task be completed and the report be
forwarded to the Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological
Program Reviews by April 7, 1983.
Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews
Washington, D.C.
November 18, 1982
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Appendix E
SHUTTLE TURNAROUND OPERATIONS
Prepared by the NASA Office of Space Shuttle Operations for the
NRC Panel to Assess Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates.
Shuttle turnaround operations are paced by the Orbiter processing
through the critical path. The Urbiter critical path extends from
landing at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), through tow to the
Orbiter Processing Facility (UPF) for processing as a flight element,
rollover to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for assembly with the
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and External Tank (ET) on the Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP) and subsequent shuttle vehicle rollout to the
pad for servicing, checkout and launch. The principal parallel activ-
ities include stacking the two SRBs on the MLP and mating the ET to
the SRBs while the Orbiter is being processed in the OPF.
LANDING
After Orbiter larding at the SLF, safety checks for venting gasses are
made, environmental purge and coolant ground-services are connected.
The flight craw egresses and a ground crew ingresses. A tow tractor
is connected and the Orbiter is towed to the OPF, with ground-service
umbilicals connected.
OPF
In the OPF, the Orbiter is jacked a:.: leveled, access platforms are
positioned, and purge air, coolant, power and other ground services
are connected. After safing the orinance, hypergolic propellants and
other systems, the maintenance and reconfiguration activities are
initiated. Orbiter maintenance includes inspection and repair or
replacement of any failed components, including thermal protection
system (TPS) tiles.
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) maintenance includes inspections
and leak checks every mission, turbine torque tests every third mis-
sion (or one engine each mission), and component and engine replace-
ments on a less frequent schedule. Also the Orbital maneuvering
system (OHS) pods and forward reaction control system (FRCS) module
are removed and/or exchanged every fifth mission and taken to the
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Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (hMF) for a detailed inspection, test
and servicing in parallel with other Orbiter work in the OPF. The
payload, payload support fittings, and mission kits from the previous
mission are removed and those for the next mission are installed. For
payloads that are to be installed vertically at the Pad, support fit-
ting and mission kits are pre-installed in the OPP at this time. The
Orbiter integrated test is performed to verify the functional
integration of Orbiter and payload systems . The access and ground-
service connections are removed and the Orbiter is towed to the VAB
for mating.
PARALLEL OPERATIONS FOR SRB AND ET
After the solid propellant is expended in launch, the SRB's are jetti-
soned from the space shuttle, and descend to the sea by parachute.
They are retrieved and towed to shore by special recovery ships. When
on shore they are cleaned and disassembled, and the eight motor seg-
ments are returned to Thiokol's Utah facility for reloading of pro-
pellant. Damage to the aft and forward skirt assemblies caused by
reentry and impact with the water is repaired, and the skirt assem-
blies, thrust vector control actuators and -auxiliary power units are
refurbished. Such repairs and refurbishments are presently conducted
in Hangars AF and N and in the low bay area of the VAB at KSC.
While the Orbiter is being processed in the OPF, the SRBs and ET
are processed and assembled in the VAB to be ready for Orbiter mate.
The four motor segments per SRB arrive horizontally on railcars and
are off-loaded, rotated and stored vertically. The SRB aft booster
assembly buildup includes mating the aft segment onto the aft skirt
assembly and attaching the nozzle extension to the aft segment nozzle
assembly. The segments are then lifted individually by crane to the
VAB and stacked on the MLP, which is located in one of the two assem-
bly cells in the VAB. The two aft booster assemblies are stacked
first and *_hen the two aft center segments, etc., until four segments
and the forward assembly are stacked on each SRB. The forward assem-
bly includes the forward skirt, frustum and nose cone sections, which
enclose the parachute and electronics equipment. The tunnel and
harnesses are then installed, connecting the forward and aft assem-
blies. After the ET is checked out in an ET cell, it is mated between
the two Sk;s and the horizontal aft struts are pretensioned with a
compressive load. The SRB/ET assembly is then ready for Orbiter mate.
MATING IN THE VAB
When the Orbiter arrives in the transfer aisle of the VAB, it is
fitted with lifting slings and lifted horizontally by cranes so the
landing gears can be retracted and the flight umbilicals adjusted for
mate. The Orbiter is then rotated to a vertical position, lifted into
r
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the vehicle assembly cell and mated to the ET. ET/Orbiter mating in-
cludes connecting and torquing the three pyro bolts in the load-
carrying ball joints, attaching the left and right pyro-releasable
flight umbilical assemblies, and connec'_ing the left and right
Orbiter-to-ground (tail service mast) 'T-zero* umbilicals. Access
platforms support ET/Orbiter mating and allow a test crew to ingress.
With electrical power and other support services through the T-0 um-
bilicals, the Shuttle interface test is conducted to verify satis-
factory integration of the Orbiter, ET, SRS, and MLP (T-0) systems.
This test also verifies flight software interfaces when significant
changes to software have been made. The access platforms are then
retracted, and a crawler transporter lifts the MLB and Shuttle vehicle
assembly to carry it to the launch pad.
LAUNCH PAD
After the MLP and Shuttle assembly are positioned on the launch pad
and bolted down, the launch support systems are connected. These
include the main propellant systems, water systems, ET hydrogen T-0
umbilicals, oxygen vent arm, Orbiter access arm and rotating service
structure (RSS). The launch pad validation tests are performed to
verify all launch support system interfaces. If a payload is to be
installed vertically, it will have been positioned in the payload
changeout room (PCR) on the RSS prior to Shuttle rollout to the pad.
The PCR doors and Orbiter bay doors will be opened and the payload
transferred into the Orbiter, mated and powered up at this time. The
pad is then cleared and the hypergolic propellant systems are loaded,
including all reaction control systems, orbital maneuvering systems,
auxiliary power units and hydraulic power units. The pad is opened
for countdown preparations and pre-count, during which cargo checks
are made, the fuel cell reactant ground support equipment (GSE) dewars
are loaded, and guidance and control checks and closeouts are per-
formed. During countdown, the fuel cell reactants are loaded on
board, the payload bay and PCR doors are closed, main propellants are
loaded and the RSS is retracted. After inertial measurement unit
warm-up, the flight crew ingresses and final countdown is initiated.
During final countdown, the Orbiter access arm and oxygen vent arm are
retracted. After main engine start, all three T-0 umbilicals and all
SRB hold-downs are released as the SRBs are ignited and the shuttle
vehicle is launched.
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Appendix F
SOLID ROCK= BOOSTER REFURBISHING AND PROCESSING FOR FLIGH9
WASATCH, UTAH
-Re;:ii Uwh / recast
Solid Rocket Motors
at Thiokol facility
HANGAR
AF
Delivery from recovery ships,
disassemble, inspect, dean
r SRB REFURBISHING AND SERVICING FACILITIES (RSF)'—I
HANGAR NI
—Process aft skirt,
component replacement
Test aft skirt— HOTFIRE
I
' Paint, applyI thermal protection, I
assemble aft skirt,I LOW BAY frustum, forward
skirt, mechanical
and electrical
checkout.
VEHICLE ASSEMBLY
BUILDING
PROCESSING AND STORAGE
FACILITY (under
construction)	
—Final assembly,
stacking
•A dedicated facility for RSF activities is under consideration.
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Abbreviations
APU - Auxiliary Power Units
CCAFS- Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
CoF - Construction of Fecilities
CSOC - Consolidated Space Operations Center (USAF)
DoD - Department of Defense
BLV - Expendable Launch Vehicles
FPL - Full Power Level
ST - External Tank
PR - Firing Room
JSC - Johnson Space Center
KSC - Kennedy Space Center
MhF - Michoud Assembly ]Facility
MCC - Mission Control Center
MLP - Mobile Launch Plat:ora
MSFC - Marshall Space Flight Center
NSTL - National Space Technology Laboratories
OPF - Orbiter Processing Facility
OV - Orbiter Vehicle
PAD - Launch Pad
PSF - Processing and Storage Facility
SCA - Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
SLA - Super Light Ablator
SMS - Shuttle Mission Simulator
SOFI - Spray on Foam Insulation
SRB - Solid Rocket Booster
a-
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so
SRH - solid Rocket Rotor
sM - Space Sbuttle Main Rtngine
sTA - sbuttle Training Aircraft
STS - Space Transportation system
TPS	 - Tbermal Protection Syste•
VAB - Vehicle Assembly Building
VMS - Vandenberg Air Force Base
VPF - Vertical Processing Facility
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